

# nominet

Rollover and Die?

George Michaelson, APNIC


Geoff Huston, APNIC

Patrik Wallström, IIS

Roy Arends, Nominet UK


# We're under attack!!!

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On the 16th of december, traffic more than doubled

# DNSKEY amplification attack



## DNSKEY response size

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
Response size: 990 Bytes

Query rate: 2000 qps


**15.8 Mbps**

Additional load

# Who does this?



# What was special about the 16th?



Projects - DISI

https://www.ripe.net/projects/disi/keys/

- 4.2.0.0.1.6.0.1.0.0.2.ip6.arpa
- 5.2.0.0.1.6.0.1.0.0.2.ip6.arpa
- 6.2.0.0.1.6.0.1.0.0.2.ip6.arpa
- 7.2.0.0.1.6.0.1.0.0.2.ip6.arpa

The latest trust anchors are available in the following two formats:

**BIND-style:**

You can download the file containing all the keys published on 16 December 2009 [here](#).

And the PGP signature of the file [here](#).

**Zone-file format:**

You can download the file containing all keys published on 16 December 2009 [here, in zone-file format](#).

And the PGP signature of the file [here](#).

As explained in the draft version of the [key maintenance procedure](#), new keys will be added or removed as per the schedule below.

**Most Recent Key Event:**

16 December 2009: Current (deprecated) keys are removed. One key in use.

**Future Key Roll Summary:**

23 March 2010: New keys are published, current keys are deprecated but not removed. Two keys in use.  
14 June 2010: Current (deprecated) keys are removed. One key in use.  
21 September 2010: New keys are published, current keys are deprecated but not removed. Two keys in use.

You can find more information on the [DISI](#) pages of this site. There is also more information on DNSSEC available. You should see the [DNSSEC HOWTO](#), and [DNSSEC Deployment at the RIPE NCC](#) pages.

**Important Note:**

Configuring DNSSEC on your name servers may cause problems if your firewall filters DNS packets larger than 512 bytes. DNSSEC requires EDNS support, which allows packet sizes larger than 512 bytes.

If your name server is behind a firewall that blocks these packets, you either need to configure your firewall to allow EDNS packets, or you can configure your name server to send EDNS packets smaller than 512 bytes.

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## What was special about the 16th?

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### **Zone-file format:**

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And the PGP signature of the file [here](#).

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## Hanlon's razor

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Never attribute to **malice** that which can be explained by **stupidity**.

## Why so many clients?

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- Fedora bug report 17th Jan 2010
  - (1 month after the roll)
- operator reports getting 240.000 log entries in 24hr
  - “no valid key”
- dnssec-conf tool contained a hard-configured trust anchor file
  - obsolete after the 16th.


What was special about the 16th?

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what a great lesson


Randy Bush's response

# Current load for in-addr.arpa




getting better, below 1000 qps right now  
But decline not fast enough before new roll

# The Load Projection




# Was this a one off event?



Sweden, june 2009

# Was this a one off event?



Sweden, june 2008


## Why so many Queries?

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- Resolvers are supposed to cache dnskey
- Even when those are bad
- Resolvers should be nice, not aggressive
- So many resolvers, so few servers

# Why so many Queries?

- Bind bug in all versions
- Depth First Search (DFS) problem
- Chain of trust validation:



$$3 * 3 * 13 * 13 * 20 * 20 = 608400 \text{ queries}$$

- Reported the depth first search bug on february 8th
- Acknowledged the problem
  - fundamental fix, needs thorough testing.
- released BIND 9.7.0 with bug
  - first version that can validate the root
  - “Exercise caution”, ignores the lame DS issue
- released BIND 9.6.2 with bug
  - root-validation back ported, no 5011
    - tick tock
- Announced a patch as soon as possible.
  - still waiting
  - folks are deploying 9.7.0 and 9.6.2 right now

# The Perfect Storm

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- DNSSEC deployment at root (DURZ)
  - guess what: lame trust-anchor, don't configure

```
02:23:13.904447 IP 94.254.84.99.29484 > 192.112.36.4.53: 5784% [1au] DNSKEY? . (28)
02:23:14.063617 IP 94.254.84.99.56185 > 202.12.27.33.53: 58470% [1au] DNSKEY? . (28)
02:23:14.096800 IP 94.254.84.99.19540 > 192.33.4.12.53: 63411% [1au] DNSKEY? . (28)
02:23:14.202476 IP 94.254.84.99.23210 > 128.63.2.53.53: 43288% [1au] DNSKEY? . (28)
02:23:14.302964 IP 94.254.84.99.61614 > 193.0.14.129.53: 60641% [1au] DNSKEY? . (28)
02:23:14.443820 IP 94.254.84.99.39117 > 128.8.10.90.53: 52235% [1au] DNSKEY? . (28)
02:23:14.580610 IP 94.254.84.99.1832 > 192.228.79.201.53: 41792% [1au] DNSKEY? . (28)
02:23:14.749730 IP 94.254.84.99.42450 > 192.203.230.10.53: 52903% [1au] DNSKEY? . (28)
02:23:14.934376 IP 94.254.84.99.32392 > 199.7.83.42.53: 48480% [1au] DNSKEY? . (28)
02:23:15.073805 IP 94.254.84.99.18993 > 192.5.5.241.53: 53794% [1au] DNSKEY? . (28)
02:23:15.083405 IP 94.254.84.99.18362 > 192.58.128.30.53: 32638% [1au] DNSKEY? . (28)
02:23:15.536684 IP 94.254.84.99.40824 > 198.41.0.4.53: 63668% [1au] DNSKEY? . (28)
02:23:17.237648 IP 94.254.84.99.43118 > 192.36.148.17.53: 20348% [1au] DNSKEY? . (28)
02:23:17.497613 IP 94.254.84.99.26253 > 192.112.36.4.53: 27565% [1au] DNSKEY? . (28)
02:23:17.541230 IP 94.254.84.99.13293 > 128.8.10.90.53: 14401% [1au] DNSKEY? . (28)
02:23:17.677963 IP 94.254.84.99.12985 > 192.58.128.30.53: 21457% [1au] DNSKEY? . (28)
02:23:17.686715 IP 94.254.84.99.47565 > 202.12.27.33.53: 11950% [1au] DNSKEY? . (28)
02:23:17.719576 IP 94.254.84.99.52505 > 193.0.14.129.53: 27749% [1au] DNSKEY? . (28)
02:23:17.744421 IP 94.254.84.99.12667 > 192.203.230.10.53: 10018% [1au] DNSKEY? . (28)
02:23:17.929291 IP 94.254.84.99.4109 > 128.63.2.53.53: 46561% [1au] DNSKEY? . (28)
02:23:18.029820 IP 94.254.84.99.43702 > 192.228.79.201.53: 48403% [1au] DNSKEY? . (28)
```

## The Perfect Storm

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- No automatic trust anchor roll (5011)
  - 9.7.0 implementation is buggy
    - promised fix in 9.7.1
  - 9.6.2 not planned
- DLV mishaps:
  - DLV registry promiscuously scrapes TLD keys
    - Just another chain of trust
  - .PR rolled its key
    - was unavailable to DLV users for days
    - caused a major packet storm

## The Perfect Storm

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- Multiple trust anchor problem
  - TLD Trust Anchors trump Root Trust Anchor
    - stale TLD Trust Anchor trumps valid Root Trust Anchor
- Doom scenario:
  - TLD registers DS in root
  - new policy: don't announce rolls, depend on root
    - That is the way NS records works as well
  - Operators won't update TLD trust anchor anymore
    - Why would they, they've configured root trust-anchor

## A Series Of Unfortunate Events

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- buggy software
- DNSSEC @ root
- multiple trust anchor problem
- no 5011 deployment
- opportunistic DLV scraping
- Frequent Rollover Syndrome
  - rolling rolling rolling, keep them DNSKEYs rolling.

## Frequent Rollover Syndrome

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- Advice seems to be:
  - roll the key as often as you can
  - Some roll twice a year, some roll monthly
- Advice is completely misguided:
  - too many sigs do not leak the key.
  - Intention is to mitigate a compromised key fallout
  - but there is no perfect forward security
- If a key can be compromised in 1 year, it can be compromised in 6 months for twice the cost
- Other reasons: educate operators, exercise procedures
  - all irrelevant, never mess with a critical production system

## Solution

- Fix the buggy software already
  - stop releasing versions that have problems
  - (Help fund BIND-10)
- Don't roll keys (too often)
  - be practical
- Do not endorse configuration of trust-anchors when parent is signed.
  - no 5011, no web-page with listed keys, no DLV, no ITAR
  - Manage all through a signed parent.
- When parent is not signed:
  - Use proper 5011. Use ISC's DLV.

Questions ? Remarks ? Observations ?

<http://www.potaroo.net/ispcol/2010-02/rollover.html>

Thanks to  
Anand Buddhdev  
Patrik Wallström  
George Michaelson  
Geoff Huston  
David Conrad  
Folks at ISC

Question: If you've deployed DNSSEC and rolled your (ksk) key, look at the stats around that period, and (pretty) please report them back to us.